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We discuss metrics of globalization for individual economies as distance measures between 
fully integrated and trade restricted equilibria in economies initially operating under less than 
full integration with the global economy. Such metrics can be used to construct country 
globalization metrics reflecting the distance of economies from full global integration due to 
trade barriers, barriers to factor flows, barriers to international financial intermediation, solved 
technological diffusion and other economy specific features yielding less than full integration 
into the global economy. Many distance metrics present themselves and none are wholly 
satisfactory since they each behave differently across various displacements from integration. 
Distance measures can, for instance, be small in goods space but large in price space. We 
present alternative measures constructed for eight OECD economies and comment in a 
concluding section on other measures used elsewhere in the literature such as trade / GDP 
ratios. 
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Globalization is simultaneously one of the most overused and ill deﬁned terms in contemporary
policy discussion, and conveys diﬀerent things to diﬀerent disciplinary researchers. Some of
these meanings are discussed in Whalley (2004). Our point of departure relative to the current
literature is to focus on the measurement of globalization, asking how globalized are particular
economies, and how rapidly (or slowly) is globalization occurring?
Various indices of the extent of globalization appear in popular discussion. The Economist,
for instance, publishes an annual index of globalization 1 in which Singapore typically appears
as the most globalized of all national economies. 2 It is also commonly argued that the world
economy today is as integrated as it was in 1913 (see Cable (1995) and Irwin (2001)). Are these
positions able to be substantiated through constructed measures of globalization? Typically,
such indices rely on trade/GDP ratios and other variables which are larger for small entrepot
economies.
Our approach here is to stay within the globalization discussion emphasized in the analyti-
cally based economics literature which takes globalization to be ever deeper market based eco-
nomic integration. The emphasis is on more trade and investment ﬂows, increased international
labour mobility, more rapid execution of cross border transactions rather than the governance
and identity issues stressed by political scientists and sociologists. We ask how metrics of the
degree to which individual economies are globalized may be developed and calculated.
Following the classical general equilibrium trade literature, we discuss how close particular
economies are to an equilibrium that would characterize full integration into the global econ-
omy (such as free trade in goods, full factor mobility, or both) assuming such equilibria are
unique. There is little or no literature we are aware of which explicitly compares equilibria
using distance metrics 3; the main focus of prior general equilibrium literature being on com-
1Another such index is published annually in Foreign Policy, see the March - April 2004 issue.
2But on the basis of commodity price comparisons to neighbouring economies (particularly
Malaysia) Singapore would appear as substantially less fully integrated into the global economy
than many other economies.
3Measures of distance between equilibria are also critical in a number of other curremt sub-
areas of economics. In the calibration area, for instance, inexact calibration (see Dawkins,
Srinivasan, and Whalley (2001)) involves choosing parameter values for equilibrium structures
so as to produce model generated equilibria as close as possible to observed data (pre-adjusted
for compatibility with model equilibrium conditions), and closely related metrics of distance
between equilibria are also needed here.
2parative statics and issues of existence, uniqueness, and stability (see Arrow and Hahn (1971),
and Mas-Colell (1985)). Our analysis, therefore, forms part of a wider discussion of how far
equilibrium observations for economies are from other hypothetical equilibria; in this case those
that would be generated under complete openness (free trade and free factor ﬂows).
In what follows, we ﬁrst formalize alternative metrics of globalization as distance measures
between equilibria, and then explore the behavior of these metrics using data on simple forms
of restricted equilibria for some sample economies. We use data for eight OECD countries
(Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, UK, US) to make calculations of metrics of
globalization using these measures. These are chosen as a sample of countries varying by size,
level of income per capita, trade pattern, and size of trade barriers.
We calibrate a simple general equilibrium model to observed data reﬂecting less than full
integration in the presence of existing trade barriers, and then use the model parametrizations
generated in this way to compute counterfactual free trade equilibria. The next step is construct
various globalization distance metrics between observed and counterfactual equilibria for each
country. We ﬁrst consider direct price and quantity measures of distance, calculating the sum
of squares of diﬀerences in either prices or quantities (or both) between equilibria. The second
measure looks at the absolute value of excess demands. Equilibrium prices of one equilibrium are
introduced into the model generating the other equilibrium to generate the excess demands.
Measures are constructed for both goods or factors excess demands. We ﬁnally construct
endowment change metrics of distance following Debreu (1951), which also require explicit
model structures and parameters for their implementation.
Our conclusion from the calculations we report on is that these globalization distance metrics
can behave in diﬀerent ways and numerical measures of the degree of globalization can therefore
be hard to interpret. No unambiguously preferred metric seems to oﬀer itself, despite the
growing importance attached to distance metrics in globalization debate. We then pursue a
more limited objective, namely to construct relative globalization measures. That is, can the
data tells us which countries are more globalized than others? Here we are more successful.
The data provide some guidance as to which countries are relatively more globalized. Parallels
to the literature on inequality measures are also drawn.
32 The Analytics of Globalization Distance Measures
In this section we develop some analytics for distances measure which can be used to assess
how close to or far away the equilibrium for a particular economy is from that which would
characterize full integration into the global economy. We assume that we are to compare a
trade (or factor ﬂow) restricted equilibrium to a full integration equilibrium and only one of
these equilibria will be observed (typically an equilibrium in the presence of trade and factor
ﬂow restrictions). We thus ﬁrst calibrate models to data on actual economies in the presence
of such restrictions, and then use the parametrizations generated for these models to compute
unobservable free trade equilibrium. We make the strong assumption in what follows that both
free trade and restricted equilibria are unique 4.
We begin with some simple measures of distance between two equilibria, calculated by
summing the squares of diﬀerences across equilibria in endogenous variables (prices, quantities),
noting that these are several issues which arise with such measures. One is that if price variables
are involved they are not invariant to alternative price normalizations. Another is that the
rationale for including all variables in such measures (such as both prices and quantities) is
not clear, while neither is it clear that some variables should be excluded. If only a subset of
variables are included in such distance measures one has to rationalize which they are and why
they should be used. Hence, we choose to calculate distance measures for price and quantity
for both goods and factors of production.
The second type of distance measure we develop involves computing excess demands at non-
equilibrium prices. For these measures we take the prices from one equilibrium and use them in
the model of the economy generating the other equilibrium and calculate the size of the implied
excess demands. In the small open economy case, domestic prices are given by world prices
gross of tariﬀs. If we calibrate a model using gross of tariﬀ prices, we can then introduce net of
tariﬀ prices and recompute the excess demands (i.e. trade in the form of imports and exports).
We take the absolute value of the change in excess demands relative to total demands as the
distance measure between the two equilibria. These are model dependent measures in that
the numerical value of the distance measure will vary as the underlying model parametrization
used to calibrate to the equilibrium data changes (say, as elasticities of substitution and share
parameters in CES functions change).
4But see the discussion of the likelihood of multiplicity of equilibria in models similar to those
we use in Kehoe (1991) and Whalley and Zhang (2004)
4These are also issues with these types of measures. One is that they are only operational
in the sense of producing a single valued measure where there are point-to-point mappings (a
pure exchange economy), not correspondences (economies with production). Another is that
one can have pairs of equilibria under this class of measures which yield sharp diﬀerences in
distance measures (close, far) in prices and quantities as indicated above.
Finally, we use a third class of distance measures in parameter space. These are measures
in the spirit of the Debreu (1951) coeﬃcient of resource utilization which yield the maximum
proportional uniform shrinkage in the endowments of an economy that is possible subject to the
constraint that the utility of a representative consumer is preserved as distortions are removed,
a measure of the degree of ineﬃciency of an economy. Using this type of globalization metric
implies that, in a two consumer, two good, two factor model of an economy, one computes the
maximal proportional shrinkage for each of the two factor endowments which preserves utility
for a simple representative consumer as trade barriers are removed.
That there is seemingly no satisfactory way of choosing between these alternative measures
since there is no single measure which dominates all other measures. Each will yield a numer-
ical measure of distance, and these metrics will behave diﬀerently across alternative pairwise
equilibrium comparisons. One measure may indicate a large distance between equilibria and
another small. The interpretation of such measures thus becomes an issue. What can one
conclude, for instance, if endowments change by, say, 10% in a Debreu type measure in com-
parisons across equilibria while an excess demand calculation implies say a 50% measure for
the same tariﬀ barrier. Our propose is thus to raise the issue of which distance measures to
use in the globalization debate and whether diﬀerent measures are appropriate for diﬀerent
circumstances.
To show more concretely how measures of distance can be constructed between globalized
and non-globalized equilibria, we take the simple case of a small open price taking economy with
2 produced goods and 2 factors of production. For this economy, there will be various features
which limit integration into the global economy, such as tariﬀs, domestic taxes, quotas and
other policy interventions. We assume these are present in the observed restricted equilibrium,
but absent in the hypothetical globally integrated equilibrium.

















, j = 1,2 (1)
where Qj denotes output of the j-th industry, φj is the scale or units parameter, δjf is the
distribution parameter (
P
f δjf = 1), Tjf is the labor and capital factor input (f = L,K), and
σj is the elasticity of factor substitution.
























, j = 1,2 f = L,K (2)
where Bf is the price of factor f (per-unit factor costs for the industry).
On the demand side of the economy we consider a representative consumer with a CES




















where Xj is the quantity of good j demanded by the consumer, αj is the share parameter
(
P
j αj = 1), and σ is the substitution elasticity in the consumer’s CES utility function.
Consumer income has three parts, endowment income
P





and a foreign resource transfer R reﬂecting the ﬁnancing of any trade imbalance 5. We assume








j Zj + R (4)
where Wf (f = L,K) is the consumer’s endowment of labor and capital, Zj = Xj − Qj is the
import and export of good j (excess demands for goods).
World prices for goods are P0
j and are taken as given exogenously, and the tariﬀ rate on
imports of goods j is rj. rj > 0 if good j is imported (Xj > Qj), and rj = 0 if good j is
exported (Xj ≤ Qj). The domestic price of good j is Pj = (1 + rj)P0
j .
The consumer’s budget constraint is
X
j
PjXj = I (5)
5We incorporate the trade imbalance in this way since typically for actual economy data to
be used in model calibrateion will not bo consistent with zero trade balance
6where Pj is the consumer price for good j.








, j = 1,2 (6)
The equilibrium conditions in this model are that market demand equals market supply
for all factors, and that proﬁts are zero in each industry. Goods markets will be characterized
by domestic excess demands that meet the trade imbalance constraint. These equilibrium
conditions are that
[1] Demands equal supply for factors
X
j
Tjf = Wf, f = L,K (7)
[2] Zero proﬁt conditions hold in both industries
X
f
BfTjf = PjQj, j = 1,2 (8)
For this economy, an equilibrium is characterized by factor prices BL and BK, and domestic
prices P1 and P2 (given world prices P0
1 and P0
2), such that equations (7) and (8) hold.








= [φjPj]1−σj, j = 1,2 (9)




Tjf − Wf, f = L,K (10)
and excess demand of goods
Zj = Xj − Qj, j = 1,2 (11)
the equilibrium conditions can be rewritten as [1] excess demands for factors are zero, i.e.
Yf = 0,f = L,K; and [2] zero proﬁt conditions hold in both industries (i.e. Equation (8)).
At such an equilibrium we can also show that the trade imbalance constraint is satisﬁed.








j Zj + R (12)






















j Zj + R (14)




j Zj = R (15)
which is trade balance.
Into this economy, we can introduce a wide range of trade distorting instruments beyond
tariﬀs, such as domestic taxes and quotas. All of these policy interventions will limit the degree
of integration of the economy into the wider global economy. Assuming for now that equilibria
in this economy are unique, this economy has two equilibria for case with and without policy
interventions. We label these restricted and unrestricted economies as E(1) and E(2). Typically
we will use an observed equilibrium E(1) and a model parametrization will be calibrated from
the equilibrium data consistent with it. The other equilibrium E(2) will be computed as a
counterfactual equilibrium. We can also construct various distance measures between equilibria






















We ﬁrst consider simple normalized Euclidean distance measures between restricted









































































































Constructing these measures requires data on the two equilibrium outcomes. The measures
MB and MP are dependent on the choice of price normalization.
We can also construct excess demand measures between the two economies: E(1) and




















jf ) are the
associated variable values. We assume E(1) in the presence of barriers is observed, and we then
eliminate the tariﬀ in the case where this is the trade barrier and introduce the net of tariﬀ prices
into the model parametrization supporting E(2) and compute excess demands. This procedure
does not yield an equilibrium solution to the model, but does suggest locally how large the
change in excess demands for goods (factors) would be if trade barriers were eliminated.
We construct excess demand measures in factor space by introducing the production values
Q
(2)
j into the model supporting Economy E(1), and evaluating excess demand functions for
factors Y
(10)
f given by equation (10). Given Q
(2)
j , we solve for T
(10)
jf from Equation (2), for



















































jf − Wf (f = L,K) as in equation

















In this evaluation of factor excess demands full employment conditions do not hold, and so





















j . Solving for consumption X
(10)


























9we can also generate an excess demand distance measure between E(1) and E(2) in terms of
goods excess demands Z
(10)
j using Equation (11). This yields a goods excess demand measure















We can ﬁnally construct Debreu type shrinkage measures of distance between the two





















jf ) are the associated variable values. To do this we use P
(2)
j in the model speciﬁcation
supporting Economy E(1), and compute an equilibrium for the case here tariﬀs are eliminated




f which yields unchanged
utility for the representative consumer. MD1 yields the Debreu type shrinkage measure of
distance between the two equilibria E(1) and E(2).
103 Applying Globalization Distance Metrics to Actual Economies
To investigate how the distance measures set out above behave in practice, and what numer-
ical measures of globalization distance are implied for particular economies, we have used the
simple 2 good, 2 factor trade model set out above to construct globalization distance measures
for a sample of OECD economies. We use the OECD STAN database for 2000 which provides
consistent data on consumption, production, and trade for all OECD economics. Into this we
also introduce measures of average tariﬀ rates on imports taken from OECD sources. We ﬁnd
this OECD data simpler to use and in some ways more applicable to our needs than the GTAP
data base.
The procedures set out in Section 2 are relatively simple to implement, but there are a
number of issues of detail that arise. One is that in a model in which factors are fully mobile the
production frontier will be close to linear for conventional functional forms such as Cobb Douglas
and CES unless share and substitution parameters diﬀer sharply across sectors. This means
that for a small tariﬀ change the model will be driven to specialization and as a result will be
diﬃcult to ﬁt to the data. In order to get around this problem, we restrict ourselves to compute
globalization distance measures for suﬃciently small tariﬀ reductions that specialization does
not occur in the model.
Also, calculating globalization distance measure in practice requires a number of prior judg-
ment calls in the use and interpretation of data, as is typical in most subjective numerical
modelling in economics. In our empirical implementation of distance metrics, we ﬁrst need to
select our sample of countries. We have chosen Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mex-
ico, UK, US as our sample of OECD economies since these diﬀer in size, their trade patterns,
their levels of development, and their degree of openness. We take data for the year 2000 for
each of these economies and consider each of them in isolation from each other, modelling each
country as a small open price taking economy (clearly a strong assumption in the US case).
We construct an initial base case data set reﬂecting an equilibrium for each of these
economies in the presence of domestic trade restrictions, which for simplicity we limit to tariﬀs.
The equilibrium data are set out in Table 1. To generate this data set we take information from
the STAN database in value terms in domestic currency from which we assemble consumption,
production, factor by sector, and net trade for each country for the year 2000.
11Table 1 Value Data Reﬂecting Assumed 2000 Benchmark Equilibria
for a Sample of OECD Economies1
(Country Data in Domestic Currency2)
Australia Germany Italy Japan Korea Mexico UK US
Value of Output
NM
3 55,593 27,750 35,534 7,772 26,320 272,188 34,109 267,362
M
3 73,354 423,220 220,604 112,114 163,283 1,013,597 153,671 1,520,263
Value of Factor Use
L
3 - NM 10,505 15,870 8,314 2,382 3,115 51,105 6,163 89,190
L
3 - M 40,296 310,640 122,207 59,506 59,670 311,239 110,483 981,781
K - NM 45,088 11,880 27,220 5,390 23,205 221,083 27,946 178,172
K - M 33,058 112,580 98,397 52,608 103,613 702,358 43,188 538,482
Value of Net Trade (Imports - Exports)
NM -23,421 48,333 26,554 9,604 42,072 -131,025 -0,325 89,103
M 49,096 -120,091 -37,996 -19,178 -57,401 145,532 36,799 321,348
Value of Consumption
NM 32,172 76,083 62,088 17,376 68,392 141,163 33,784 356,465
M 122,450 303,129 182,608 92,936 105,882 1,159,129 190,470 1,841,611
Initial Tariﬀ Rate on Imports
4
NM 0.000000 0.208675 0.208675 0.158008 0.368725 0.000000 0.000000 0.109535
M 0.105931 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.348223 0.041334 0.033641
1 Sources: OECD STAN database plus Table 2
2 These value units in domestic currency are AUD 106, EUR 106, EUR 106, JPY 109, KRW
109, MXP 106, GBP 106, and USD 106.
3 In this table, M and NM denote Total Manufacturing and Non Manufacturing (Agriculture,
Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying); L and K denote Labour and Capital.
4 See Table 2 for the underlying data used to generate tariﬀ averages reputed here.
12We use a two sector classiﬁcation for each economy in which we ﬁrst ignore all service related
and non-tradable transactions such as utilities, government activity, retailing, wholesaling, dis-
tribution, banking, and ﬁnancial services. We only consider two aggregate traded goods sectors
which we take to reﬂect manufacturing and non-manufacturing activity. From the STANs data,
“total manufacturing” is taken as manufacturing and “agriculture, ﬁshing, forestry, and mining
/quarrying” are taken as non-manufacturing. Since the 2 × 2 case requires as many factors as
goods in the model, this is a relatively easy case to implement. Subsequent applications of this
approach can easily (but more tediously) be applied to multisector, multifactor models and the
change of the level of aggregation in data will clearly aﬀect the numerical value of globalization
measures generated.
STAN data give value added according to our sectorial classiﬁcation, and also provide data
on the compensation of employees. The return to capital is constructed by residual for each
sector as the diﬀerence between the two. We make the strong assumption that the output of each
sector is given only by the value added originating in the sector, and we ignore all intermediate
transactions. This yields data on output and factor use by sector in value terms for each country
for our benchmark year. This data is in value terms, and to produce equilibrium data on both
prices and quantities we need to adopt a units convention for the measurement of both goods
and factors. We follow the convention attributed to Harberger (1962) and discussed in Shoven
and Whalley (1992) of assuming unitary prices for factors, and unitary world prices for goods
in the trade distorted equilibrium. This yields domestic prices for imports as one plus the tariﬀ
rate.
We use the trade data in STANs on a net trade basis which nets out imports and exports
(again in value terms) by good (for our 2 good classiﬁcation) for each country. This yields
consumption as production plus net trade. This substantially reduces trade volumes relative
to published trade data. Most of the OECD economies we consider are net exporters of man-
ufactured goods. Balanced trade does not hold for this net trade data by country since some
countries have trade surpluses and others (notably the US) have trade deﬁcits. One procedure
to handle trade imbalances is to modify the data to force balanced trade; another is to use a
model which incorporates a ﬁxed trade imbalance (which is non-zero). We choose the latter
procedure. For the US, this yields the feature that both goods are imported, and ﬁnanced by
foreign resource transfers supporting the observed trade imbalance.
We use tariﬀ rate data from OECD sources as our trade barrier measure in the restricted
13equilibrium. This data is presented in Table 2 which reports the tariﬀ data we have relied on for
our barrier estimates. This data is from OECD Sources on bound tariﬀ rates by Harmonized
Nomenclature section headings, and this gives the fraction of line items in speciﬁed tariﬀ lines
falling in numerical ranges of tariﬀ rates. We have aggregated this data using simple means
for in sample ranges. We do not employ trade weighted average, nor use applied rather than
bound tariﬀ rates. There is a considerable literature on constructing tariﬀ averages, which for
simplicity we ignore. We use statutory rather than eﬀective tariﬀ rates.
14Table 2 OECD Data on Tariﬀ Intervals by HS Section
(Post-Uruguay Round Bound Rates) by Country Used
to Calculate Country Tariﬀ Rates in Table 11 2
(% of Tariﬀ Nomenclature Section Headings in Speciﬁed Rate Ranges by Country)
Tariﬀ
Binding Australia Germany Italy Japan Korea Mexico UK US
Ranges
Non Manufacturing
Duty Free 32.6 26.5 26.5 31.0 2.2 0.1 26.5 27.9
0 − 5% 16.2 16.1 16.1 19.1 8.4 3.3 16.1 16.7
5 − 10% 1.6 9.3 9.3 6.7 16.6 3.0 9.3 2.0
10 − 15% 0.0 7.7 7.7 1.2 19.1 8.4 7.7 0.1
15 − 20% 44.0 12.2 12.2 22.0 7.2 0.0 12.2 48.1
20 − 50% 4.2 11.2 11.2 10.3 8.1 0.3 11.2 4.7
> 50% 1.4 17.0 17.0 9.6 38.6 84.8 17.0 0.4
Manufacturing
Duty Free 18.7 22.2 22.2 53.8 13.5 0.2 22.2 37.2
0 − 5% 19.6 43.0 43.0 28.4 7.1 0.0 43.0 39.6
5 − 10% 28.1 27.3 27.3 14.5 23.8 0.2 27.3 15.6
10 − 15% 17.7 7.0 7.0 2.7 36.8 0.0 7.0 5.6
15 − 20% 2.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 8.2 0.3 0.4 1.3
20 − 50% 11.6 0.2 0.2 0.4 10.5 99.2 0.2 0.8
> 50% 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Calculated Country Average Tariﬀ Rates (Percentage)
NM 10.7450 20.8675 20.8675 15.8008 36.8725 65.1276 20.8675 10.9535
M 10.5931 4.1334 4.1334 2.3100 11.8107 34.8223 4.1334 3.3641
1 Note: Calculations are report 6 - digit HS section headings.
2 Sources: Tariﬀs and Trade: OECD query and reporting system, OECD 2000.
15In the data in Table 1, the relative size of economies diﬀers, as do trade patterns and
factor use by sector, and initial tariﬀ rates. This provides the benchmark equilibrium taken
as observed for each of our sample OECD economies. We then calibrate each of our country
models to this data which we assume for now to be generated in the presence of a tariﬀ as the
only trade barrier which creates distance from full integration. We then apply the procedures
set out in the previous section to construct our globalization metrics.
In implementing these procedures, we have restricted ourselves to cases where the only
barrier limiting full integration into the global economy is a tariﬀ. In fact, there are many
barriers which limit integration into the global economy including other trade measures (quo-
tas, dumping and countervailing duties), national standards, diﬀerential regulation of ﬁnancial
institutions, transportation regulation, agricultural policies, and many others. Each of these
would need an explicit model representation that sharply diﬀers from a representation by an
ad valorem equivalent tariﬀ if they were to be sensibly incorporated into such analyses. Exten-
sions of this approach can be used to analyze these barriers also; we have not done so since our
purpose is to illustrate a general approach to constructing globalization metrics.
We calibrate the model set out in the previous section, for cases where the trade imbalance
for each economy is non-zero. The calibration procedures we use are set out in Dawkins,
Srinivasan and Whalley (2001). To implement calibration we rely on the literature to generate
substitution elasticities by sector by country, and we use values roughly consistent with those
reported in Piggott and Whalley (1985) and Hammermesh (1993) of 2.0 in non manufacturing
and 0.5 in manufacturing.
Table 3 presents the calibrated model parameter values for the model we use for each
country, along with model data on endowments and tariﬀ rates.
16Table 3 Calibrated and Other Model Parameters by Country
Reproducing the Equilibrium Data in Table 1
Australia Germany Italy Japan Korea Mexico UK US
Scale Parameters in Production
NM 1.782958 1.646108 1.527880 1.659805 1.202613 1.781035 1.769515 1.751178
M 1.790994 1.640678 1.976970 1.992457 1.864930 1.291180 1.611564 1.783280
Share Parameters in Production
L - NM 0.325550 0.536134 0.355946 0.399319 0.268142 0.324684 0.319547 0.414355
L - M 0.597721 0.883905 0.606688 0.561295 0.249053 0.164137 0.867450 0.768743
K - NM 0.674450 0.463866 0.644054 0.600681 0.731858 0.675316 0.680453 0.585645
K - M 0.402279 0.116095 0.393312 0.438705 0.750947 0.835863 0.132550 0.231257
Share Parameters in Preferences
NM 0.203951 0.208341 0.262811 0.162445 0.411299 0.101542 0.149360 0.164593
M 0.796049 0.791659 0.737189 0.837555 0.588701 0.898458 0.850640 0.835407
Initial Endowment
L 50,801 326,510 130,521 61,888 62,785 362,344 116,646 1070,971
K 78,146 124,460 125,617 57,998 126,818 923,441 71,134 716,654
Substitution Elasticities in Production (All Countries)
NM 2.0
M 0.5
Substitution Elasticities in Consumption (All Countries)
1.25
Initial Tariﬀ Rate on Imports
1 (Percentage)
NM 0.0000 20.8675 20.8675 15.8008 36.8725 0.0000 0.0000 10.9535
M 10.5931 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 34.8223 4.1334 3.3641
Foreign Resource Transfers in Domestic Currency
2
20,972.4 -80,102.6 -16,026.5 -10,884.5 -26,662.9 -23,081.5 35,013.3 352,576.6
1 Model tariﬀ rates on exports are set equal to zero, the US imports both goods, with the
trade imbalance ﬁnanced by a resource transfer from abroad.
2 Footnote from Table 1.
174 Some Calculations of Distance Measures for a Sample of OECD Economies
We have implemented calculations of globalization distance measures for the eight OECD
countries chosen in our sample for the year 2000 (Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, the UK, and the US). To make these calculations we ﬁrst calibrate each country model
as described above and then proceed to compute a trade barrier change equilibrium as our
counterfactual in each case. We then compare the initial equilibrium with the trade barrier
change equilibria.
As we note above, due to the near linearity of the production frontier in the 2 × 2 case
(see Johnson (1966), and Abrego and Whalley (2001)) specialization occurs as the equilibrium
outcome with most country models in the tariﬀ elimination case (the US, the UK, and Australia)
are the exceptions. We therefore compute three diﬀerent sets of globalization metrics for the
country models. One is with an 8% common reduction in tariﬀ rates in all countries since this
is the maximal common reduction possible. This allows for comparability across countries since
each country’s tariﬀs are reduced by the same percentage. The second considers the largest
possible reduction in the national tariﬀ such that specialization does not occur. The advantage
of this computation is that we get larger tariﬀ reductions, in some cases complete elimination
of tariﬀs. However, the disadvantage is that tariﬀs are reduced by diﬀerent percentages in
diﬀerent countries. The third and ﬁnal calculation looks at the same absolute reduction in tariﬀ
rates for each country. The maximum reduction in tariﬀ rates sustainable without leading to
specialization is 1.9%. So in the third case each country faces a 1.9% reduction in all of its
tariﬀ rates. Table 4 presents the ﬁrst set of results, Table 5 the second and the results for the
1.9% reduction in tariﬀ rates are given in Table 6.
18Table 4 Globalization Metrics for a Common 8% Reduction in Tariﬀ Rate
for a Sample of OECD Countries
Metrics Australia Germany Italy Japan Korea Mexico UK US
Tariﬀ Rate Change
NM 0.000000 0.208675 0.208675 0.158008 0.368725 0.000000 0.000000 0.109535
M 0.105931 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.348223 0.041334 0.033641
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
NM 0.000000 0.191981 0.191981 0.145367 0.339227 0.000000 0.000000 0.100772
M 0.097456 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.320365 0.038027 0.030950
Euclidean Distance Measures
MB 0.017811 0.061041 0.030250 0.033446 0.062720 0.184693 0.004956 0.013891
MP 0.008064 0.015174 0.015174 0.011750 0.025062 0.023868 0.003242 0.008577
MQ 0.035139 0.130947 0.053118 0.075660 0.107683 1.741749 0.004313 0.023990
MX 0.049851 0.203774 0.085114 0.120297 0.205375 2.648417 0.006152 0.034914
MT 0.005717 0.014704 0.007603 0.005880 0.021365 0.312117 0.001528 0.002088
Excess Demand Measures
MF1 0.008876 0.016166 0.012843 0.012785 0.021072 0.142613 0.001620 0.005427
MF2 0.008757 0.018976 0.013228 0.013567 0.021974 0.070413 0.001618 0.005514
MG1 0.498664 0.551121 0.302689 0.318401 0.650488 1.312605 0.168093 0.187149
MG2 0.472607 0.448203 0.269251 0.263651 0.581470 0.222766 0.166499 0.186741
Debreu Shrinkage Measures
MD1 -0.001384 -0.008777 -0.003937 -0.003981 -0.012864 -0.159362 -0.000083 -0.000652
MD2 0.001386 0.008856 0.003953 0.003997 0.013035 0.189577 0.000083 0.000652
19Table 5 Globalization Tariﬀ Metrics for a Sample of OECD Countries
where Maximium Possible Reductions in Tariﬀ Rates Occur
Metrics Australia Germany Italy Japan Korea Mexico UK US
Tariﬀ Rate Change
NM 0.000000 0.208675 0.208675 0.158008 0.368725 0.000000 0.000000 0.109535
M 0.105931 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.348223 0.041334 0.033641
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
NM 0.000000 0.189550 0.082779 0.125721 0.260000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
M 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.318750 0.000000 0.000000
Euclidean Distance Measures
MB 0.233503 0.068459 0.210283 0.081843 0.227912 0.194858 0.062120 0.158944
MP 0.105931 0.019125 0.125897 0.032287 0.108725 0.029473 0.041334 0.114584
MQ 0.717596 0.145425 0.309497 0.170203 0.337117 2.115240 0.058251 0.239993
MX 1.036370 0.226255 0.539441 0.276936 0.686069 3.272022 0.082343 0.360016
MT 0.068532 0.016205 0.061315 0.012864 0.071136 0.376297 0.018861 0.031064
Excess Demand Measures
MF1 0.181606 0.017950 0.077043 0.028939 0.069163 0.176719 0.021860 0.054615
MF2 0.138559 0.021491 0.090467 0.033142 0.077544 0.077322 0.021414 0.064296
MG1 0.885209 0.562865 0.488009 0.389845 0.816065 1.522364 0.199955 0.193069
MG2 0.517654 0.448735 0.302928 0.267422 0.608150 0.223772 0.177853 0.188212
Debreu Shrinkage Measures
MD1 -0.011845 -0.009712 -0.018332 -0.008516 -0.037212 -0.189353 -0.000565 -0.003818
MD2 0.011985 0.009808 0.018679 0.008589 0.038688 0.233587 0.000566 0.003832
20Table 6 Globalization Metrics for a Common Reduction 0.01912494 in Tariﬀ Rate
for a Sample of OECD Countries
Metrics Australia Germany Italy Japan Korea Mexico UK US
Tariﬀ Rate Change
NM 0.000000 0.208675 0.208675 0.158008 0.368725 0.000000 0.000000 0.109535
M 0.105931 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.348223 0.041334 0.033641
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
NM 0.000000 0.189550 0.189550 0.138883 0.349600 0.000000 0.000000 0.090410
M 0.086806 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.329098 0.022209 0.014516
Euclidean Distance Measures
MB 0.040503 0.069158 0.034584 0.049879 0.040911 0.113429 0.028831 0.025720
MP 0.018246 0.017393 0.017393 0.017804 0.016213 0.016355 0.018826 0.025467
MQ 0.082556 0.145425 0.060408 0.109474 0.071759 0.755415 0.025735 0.006022
MX 0.117143 0.226255 0.096970 0.175386 0.135584 1.105619 0.036558 0.008746
MT 0.012892 0.016205 0.008705 0.008400 0.014164 0.139410 0.008795 0.000499
Excess Demand Measures
MF1 0.020840 0.017950 0.014616 0.018538 0.013951 0.059060 0.009662 0.001361
MF2 0.020190 0.021491 0.015114 0.020212 0.014353 0.042055 0.009578 0.001356
MG1 0.517532 0.562865 0.308016 0.344006 0.624029 0.715664 0.180748 0.186633
MG2 0.477211 0.448735 0.270035 0.264954 0.577770 0.218647 0.171137 0.186734
Debreu Shrinkage Measures
MD1 -0.003067 -0.009712 -0.004458 -0.005665 -0.008658 -0.073931 -0.000395 0.000171
MD2 0.003076 0.009808 0.004478 0.005698 0.008735 0.079834 0.000395 -0.000171
21The degree of globalization or integration is decreasing in the distance of the measures
from zero. That is, countries in which the globalization measures are closest to zero are the
most globalized. Considering Tables 4,5 and 6 we ﬁnd that these results are interesting and
in some ways surprising. Looking at all three tariﬀ reduction exercises it is clear that there
is no consistency across the measures for any of the sampled countries. Consider the case
of Australia as given in Column 1 of Table 4. An 8% reduction in the tariﬀ rate reveals a
50% distance measure under measure MG1, but only a less then 1% measure for the Debreu
shrinkage measures, MD1, and MD2. Within the Euclidean distance measure group measures
diﬀer by a factor of nearly 10. Similar features occur in every country case (i.e. in results down
each column of Table 4). The results for Tables 5 and 6 are similar. Looking at these numbers,
then, one cannot draw any conclusion as to whether an 8% tariﬀ reduction moves countries
considerably closer to or only little closer to global integration.
In addition, it is not clear how to choose between these diﬀerent measures. For some
measures there are very large diﬀerences across countries while for other measures cross country
diﬀerences are small. For example, looking at Table 4 (a common 8% tariﬀ reduction) the
distance measure MX varies from a low of 0.0061 for the UK to a high of 2.6484 for Mexico.
On the other hand, the distance measure MP only varies from 0.0032 (UK) to 0.0238 (Mexico).
On the whole, given that the common 8% reduction in tariﬀ rates yields a larger absolute
tariﬀ change in countries with higher initial tariﬀs, such as Mexico, results for such countries
show higher measures than for low initial tariﬀ rate countries, such as the UK. To adjust for this
in Table 6 we look at the same absolute tariﬀ reduction for all countries. The rate reduction
we look at is about 2% and what we ﬁnd is that, as expected, the numbers get closer together.
For example, for MX the range shrinks from a low of 0.0087 (US) to a high of 1.1056 (Mexico.)
All of the MP numbers are close. The range is 0.0162 9 (Korea) to 0.0254 (US.) However,
the property that there are large diﬀerences across measures still holds in Table 6. Based on
the results to this point we thus conclude that both constructing and interpreting measures of
globalization distance is at best a diﬃcult matter given all these diﬀerences in the behavior of
measures.
4.1 Ordinal Measures
The results to this point appear quite negative. The diﬀerent globalization measures we have
chosen do not seem to yield a coherent way to measure the degree of globalization for any
22particular country. Looking down the columns of Tables 4, 5, and 6 we see that there are large
diﬀerences in globalization measures for each country for a given tariﬀ change. In addition,
looking at the rows of the tables we see that the variability of measures diﬀers widely. In fact,
if we compute the variances of each of the rows of Table 4, for example, those variances range
between 0.0000583 and 0.816742. This leads one to ask are there any coherent patterns to these
various measures?
We can give a qualiﬁed ”yes” to this question if we adopt a more limited objective. It turns
out that the data from these tables do shed some light on the relative degree of globalization.
If instead of trying to develop an absolute measure of globalization we develop an ordinal
globalization ranking we can make some progress. What we do is to take each of the eleven
measures of globalization, then rank order the countries by how globalized they are. For the
measures we have smaller numbers indicate more globalized countries. We do this only for
Tables 4 and 6 because Table 5 has diﬀerent tariﬀ reduction for each country. In Table 7 (8) we
have duplicated Table 4 (6) except in place of the actual values of each measure we have replaced
them with the rankings. A ranking of 1 means that the country is the most globalized of all
eight countries we consider and a ranking of 8 means that the country is the least globalized.
23Table 7 Globalization Rankings for a Common 8% Reduction in Tariﬀ Rate
for a Sample of OECD Countries
Metrics Australia Germany Italy Japan Korea Mexico UK US
Tariﬀ Rate Change
NM 0.000000 0.208675 0.208675 0.158008 0.368725 0.000000 0.000000 0.109535
M 0.105931 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.348223 0.041334 0.033641
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
NM 0.000000 0.191981 0.191981 0.145367 0.339227 0.000000 0.000000 0.100772
M 0.097456 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.320365 0.038027 0.030950
Euclidean Distance Measures
MB 3 6 4 5 7 8 1 2
MP 2 5 5 4 8 7 1 3
MQ 3 7 4 5 6 8 1 2
MX 3 6 4 5 7 8 1 2
MT 3 6 5 4 7 8 1 2
Excess Demand Measures
MF1 3 6 5 4 7 8 1 2
MF2 3 6 4 5 7 8 1 2
MG1 5 6 3 4 7 8 1 2
MG2 7 6 5 4 8 3 1 2
Debreu Shrinkage Measures
MD1 3 6 4 5 7 8 1 2
MD2 3 6 4 5 7 8 1 2
24Table 8 Globalization Rankings for a Common Reduction 0.01912494 in Tariﬀ Rates
for a Sample of OECD Countries1
Metrics Australia Germany Italy Japan Korea Mexico UK US
Tariﬀ Rate Change
NM 0.000000 0.208675 0.208675 0.158008 0.368725 0.000000 0.000000 0.109535
M 0.105931 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.348223 0.041334 0.033641
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
NM 0.000000 0.189550 0.189550 0.138883 0.349600 0.000000 0.000000 0.090410
M 0.086806 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.329098 0.022209 0.014516
Euclidean Distance Measures
MB 4 7 3 6 5 8 2 1
MP 6 3 4 5 1 2 7 8
MQ 5 7 3 6 4 8 2 1
MX 4 7 3 6 5 8 2 1
MT 5 7 3 2 6 8 4 1
Excess Demand Measures
MF1 7 5 4 6 3 8 2 1
MF2 5 7 4 6 3 8 2 1
MG1 5 6 3 4 7 8 1 2
MG2 7 6 5 4 8 3 1 2
Debreu Shrinkage Measures
MD1 3 7 4 5 6 8 2 1
MD2 3 7 4 5 6 8 2 1
25Looking at Table 6 there are clear patterns of relative rankings. The UK is the most
globalized country for every ranking and the US is the second most globalized for all but one
measure. Mexico is the least globalized country and Korea is the next least globalized. Table 9
demonstrates a similar pattern, although the pattern of rankings does not appear to be as clear
cut as in Table 6. The US and UK appear to be the most globalized countries, while Mexico
and Germany seem to be the least globalized.
To try and quantify these rankings further we do a simple aggregation of the rankings for
all measures. What we do is simply add up the rankings and report the scores for both Tables 7
and 8 in Table 9. For the aggregate rankings a lower aggregate ranking means a more globalized
country. This table shows that the measures used here produce a fairly clear measure of the
relative level of globalization across countries. This suggests that while obtaining quantitatively
meaningful measures of globalization may be extremely diﬃcult, obtaining relative globalization
rankings may be an obtainable goal.
Table 9 Aggregate Globalization Rankings










We have performed further calculations with the country calibrated models which allow us to
investigate the sensitivity of distance measures with respect to critical model parameters, such
as elasticities of substitution, and with respect to the depth of tariﬀ cuts in particular cases.
For simplicity these sensitivity analyses are presented for only one country, the US. These are
displayed graphically in Figures 1 and 2.
What is striking about the results in Figure 1 is the near independence of some measures to
elasticities and extreme sensitivity in other cases. Euclidean distance measures (which them-
selves are sharply diﬀerent one from another) vary little, but excess demand measures vary more
(especially for MF2). Debreu shrinkage measures vary proportionally but little in absolute value
across elasticity values.
Figure 2 reports the variation of distance measures with the size of the tariﬀ reduction, since
the US is a country case where tariﬀ elimination is possible without specialization occurring.
Here, Euclidean distance measures behave similarly in proportional terms across diﬀerent depth
of tariﬀ cuts, being roughly linear in the depth of cut. Excess factor demand measures are also
nearly linear and behave equiproportionally. Debreu shrinkage measures behave in a non-linear
way.
27Figure 1    Sensitivity of US Globalization Measures to Substitution 
Elasticity Parameter Value (in Sector Non Manufacturing) 
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 Figure 2    Sensitivity of US Globalization Measures to the Depth of 
Tariff Reduction 
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Our conclusion from these calculations is that just as the many measures of inequality in
the income inequality literature yield diﬀerent and non-comparable partial orderings, so with
globalization measures (and equilibrium metrics in general) there are many available measures
whose numerical behavior will diﬀer. Which to use, and how to interpret such metrics when
calculated is not clear. Seemingly measures will also vary with the degree of disaggregation in
models, the structural form of models, and the treatment of factor ﬂows and barriers. Making
sense out of the numbers which currently circulate thus seems to be a hazardous occupation.
In this paper we have discussed possible metrics of globalization for countries constructed
as distance measures between barrier restricted and more globally integrated country equilibria.
In the process we also emphasize that literature on equilibrium metrics in general is limited,
and so our paper is part of a wider discussion of possible metrics of distance across equilibria.
Our results which we report for a sample of eight OECD countries using 2000 data applied
to simple 2 × 2 country models suggest both substantial diﬀerences in measures for a single
country and diﬀerences across country in measures for the same barrier reduction. As such, our
results are on the whole negative, but they do illustrate the many pitfalls involved with measures
currently reported in popular magazines such as the Economist and Foreign Policy. When we
lower our sights a bit and ask whether these diﬀerent measures contain any information about
the degree of globalization there does seem to be information in them about the relative degree
of globalization of diﬀerent countries. The measures we look at do suggest which countries
are more globalized relative to other countries. Developing relative rankings appears to hold
promise for future research.
Our ﬁndings may appear to those outside the area to be too negative, and our tone overly
pessimistic on the measurement front so far as quantifying globalization is concerned. But little
literature exists on these issues and our hope is that our paper might spark further work in
the area that will advance on what we have to oﬀer. Our belief is that we are indeed moving
to an increasingly integrated global economy in terms of goods ﬂows and capital markets, but
with more segmentation in labour markets, where the global costs of restrictions are large 6.
Adding in the concerns of political scientists over global governance and sociologists over global
identity, to say nothing of the anti globalization protestors, may well leave globalization as an
inherently unquantiﬁable metric; but hope springs eternal, and with fortitude and perseverance
6See Hamilton and Whalley (1984)
30the challenge is for a new cottage industry of globalization quantiﬁers to emerge to ﬁll the gap.
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